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This paper aims to understand the transaction costs implications of two different governance modes for
large scale contracting of HIV prevention services to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in 2 states
in India as part of the National AIDS Control Programme between 2001 and 2003.
Interviews at purposively selected case study NGOs, contracting agencies and key informants as well
as document review were used to compile qualitative data and make comparisons between the states on
ﬁve themes theoretically proposed to shape transaction costs: institutional environment, informational
problems, opportunism, scale of activity and asset speciﬁcity (the degree to which investments made
speciﬁcally for the contract have value elsewhere).
The State AIDS Control Society (SACS) in state Y used a management agency to manage the NGO
contracts whereas the SACS in state X contracted directly with the NGOs. A high level of uncertainty,
endemic corruption and weak information systems served to weaken the contractual relationships in
both states. The management agency in state Y enabled the development of a strong NGO network,
greater transparency and control over corrupt practises than the contract model in state X. State X’s
contractual process was further weakened by inadequate human resources.
The application of the transaction cost framework to contracting out public services to NGOs identiﬁed
the key costs associated with the governance of HIV prevention services through NGO contracts in India.
A more successful form of relational contract evolved within the network of the contract management
agency and the NGOs. This led to improved ﬂows of information and perceived quality, and limited
corrupt practises. It is unlikely that the SACS on its own, with broader responsibilities and limited
autonomy can achieve the same ends. The management agency approach therefore appears to be both
transaction cost reducing and better able to cope with the large scale of these contracting programmes.
 2011 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.Introduction
At the start of the 21st century, India had put in place a massive
scale up of HIV prevention programmes. With the support of the
World Bank over 200 million USD was allocated to a ﬁve year AIDS
control programme. The programme focussed on expanding the
most cost-effective group of HIV prevention services, given the
early stage of the epidemic (National AIDS Control Organisation,
2000, 2001; World Bank Health Nutrition and Population Sector
Unit, 1999). Approximately one quarter of the budget was to be
spent on targeted interventions (HIV prevention for vulnerable
groups) and strengthening services for sexually transmitted infec-
tions (STIs) (National AIDS Control Organisation, 2000). Given the
lack of capacity within existing health services and building on license.positive experience from Tamil Nadu (Ramasundaram, Allaudin,
Charles, Gopal, Krishnamurthy, Poornalingam et al., 2001),
services for vulnerable groups were contracted out to NGOs by
a semi-autonomous government agency that operated at the state
level e the State AIDS Control Society (SACS). Contracting out had
the multiple aims of increasing coverage, avoiding inefﬁciencies of
government bureaucracy and taking advantage of the assumed
efﬁciencies of NGOs.
Contracting out health services in developing countries has
been used as a tool for increasing coverage and quality and
improving efﬁciency and equity (Liu, Hotchkiss, & Bose, 2008;
Loevinsohn & Harding, 2005). Contracting out covers a range of
activities, including the development of franchise networks, part-
nering with private sector providers for TB treatment and con-
tracting with private providers to provide health services.
Experience to date has shown these efforts can be an important
leverage for increasing coverage (Liu et al., 2008; Loevinsohn &
Harding, 2005). Improvements in quality have also been observed
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based ﬁnancing (Liu et al., 2008; Loevinsohn & Harding, 2005).
However these studies tell us little about the effectiveness of
contract design and the costs of the governance arrangements.
Evaluation of the experience of contracting out in low income
countries has largely focused on the ﬁnal outcomes of the health
services. And even where increases in coverage have been
observed, little is known about the quality of the service delivery
(Liu et al., 2008). Insights into the nature of the contracts and how
they ultimately inﬂuence provider performance are key to help
improve contractual design (Palmer & Mills, 2005). Two papers are
notable exceptions in the literature that explore the institutional
and environmental context in which contracting out operates in
low and middle income countries (Palmer & Mills, 2005; Palmer,
Strong, Wali, & Sondorp, 2006).
Transaction cost economics helps to deconstruct the contractual
process by exploring informational problems, rent-seeking and the
issue of asset speciﬁcity e i.e. the cost of giving up the contract due
to investments made that relate speciﬁcally to the contract and
have little value elsewhere (Allen, 2002; Ashton, 1998; Goddard &
Mannion, 1998; Marini & Street, 2007). Transaction costs are
deﬁned as the costs of negotiating, establishing, safeguarding and
enforcing contractual agreements (Williamson, 1983). They and the
associated governance are shaped by the presence or not of
bounded rationality (or informational problems) and uncertainty;
opportunism and asset speciﬁcity (the degree to which invest-
ments can be re-allocated to other uses if the contract is termi-
nated). The frequency of the transaction and the institutional
environment also serve to further inﬂuence the transaction costs
(Allen, 2002; Ashton, 1998; Palmer, 2000; Williamson, 1983, 1996).
In theory, the inter-play of all these factors lead to costs, or expected
costs, that result in decisions regarding the appropriate governance
form. These can range from: markets in which separate organisa-
tions or individuals contract directly with each other and all
information pertaining to the contract is known by all parties in the
transaction; to hierarchies, e.g. bureaucracy deﬁned as a “nexus of
contracts” governed by ﬁat rather than contract law and generally
characterized by low powered incentives (Alchian & Demsetz,1972;
Williamson, 1991). In between these polar extremes, hybrid forms
of governance exist where bilateral dependence has evolved
between independent organizations. One such form is Macneil’s
relational contract, in which, in the absence of a fully speciﬁed
contract, an ongoing relationship leads to self-regulation and
development of a set of behavioural norms (Hviid, 2000).
Traditionally applied to the for proﬁt sector where governance
decisions are based on the proﬁt maximising motive of ﬁrms,
transaction cost analysis can also provide useful insights into the
operation of a contractual process where governance structures are
pre-determined such as in the public sector (Palmer & Mills, 2003).
In New Zealand and South Africa respectively, Ashton (1998) and
Palmer and Mills (2005) showed how the nature of the contract
varies with the types and ranges of services (Ashton, 1998; Palmer
& Mills, 2005). Studies of contracting in the English NHS and South
Africa have indicated the importance of relational contracts and
long term ﬂexible contracts in a sector that is unpredictable,
heterogeneous and dynamic, andwhere providers are scarce (Allen,
2002; Forder, Robinson, & Hardy, 2005; Goddard & Mannion, 1998;
Palmer & Mills, 2005).
Applying this framework to the case of HIV prevention in India,
there are ﬁve key factors likely to affect the transaction costs and
governance of contracts. First, as for any contractual process, the
institutional environment that regulates the contract needs to
function effectively, whether this is the legal system itself or the
bureaucracy’s own form of governance. Second, informational
problems exist in both specifying contracts for HIV preventionprojects and monitoring. HIV prevention projects for vulnerable
groups are based on making regular contacts with the target pop-
ulation, building a rapport with that population and, during inter-
actions, providing quality sexual health education, condoms and
referral to partner doctors, for management of sexually transmitted
infections. The population of concern frequently moves locations,
temporarily or permanently, to ﬁnd their best market, are generally
excluded from society and often kept out of reach by their madams
or pimps. The multiple objectives (to provide education, improve
health of the individuals and prevent HIV in the community) that
are dependent on the building of community networks, the
mobility of the population and the complex nature of the link
between behaviour change and HIV transmission mean that
contracts cannot be fully speciﬁed but pertain only to general areas
of activity that have been shown to be effective in HIV prevention.
Monitoring the contract requires information regarding the pop-
ulation size, location, number of times an individual has been
reached and the quality of interactions. The dynamic nature of the
population and the sensitivity of the issue of HIV make monitoring
of the quality and quantity of interactions difﬁcult. This is com-
pounded by the limited capacity for monitoring both among the
SACS and the NGO staff and volunteers. As the NGO has built the
links that enable access to the community, independent veriﬁcation
of project activity is also difﬁcult to achieve. A supplementary
method to monitor progress would be to measure impact on the
spread of HIV. However, data on the impact of HIV prevention
interventions are rarely available as generation of such impact data
requires expensive epidemiological trials or mathematical model-
ling (Grassly, Garnett, Schwartlander, Gregson, & Anderson, 2002;
Merson, Dayton, & O’Reilly, 2000). Even if these data were avail-
able the impact would be difﬁcult to attribute to a speciﬁc project
given the dynamics of the target populations and their sexual
partners and the possible presence of other HIV prevention activ-
ities in the same locality.
The third factor, opportunism, in the form of corruption is
endemic in India (Transparency International, 2002). Fourth, asset
speciﬁc investments are likely to be present in two forms. Human
asset speciﬁcity is associated with working in HIV/AIDS and sexual
health and with commercial sex workers. Project staff need both
the ability to overlook society’s disapproval of commercial sex
workers and those connected with them, as well as skills and
experience in connecting with a vulnerable community and
counselling on sexual health topics. The need for local NGOs
and their partners that are established within their communities
also implies “temporal asset speciﬁcity” in which on-site human
assets are required in the delivery of the project (Williamson,1991).
These assets would include doctors willing and able to work with
commercial sex workers on sexual health, peer educators and
others with knowledge of the local sex worker community and its
networks. Finally, large numbers of contracts may compound the
information problems. According to the theory, the combination of
asset speciﬁcity, opportunism and informational problems can be
exacerbated in a situation of large numbers and will result in what
Williamson terms “serious contractual difﬁculties” where more
hierarchical forms of governance are likely to evolve to minimise
transaction costs (Williamson, 1987).
In order to better understand the contractual processes and key
factors in their successes and failures, this paper explores the
transaction costs in the contractual relationships between NGOs
and the state in the delivery of HIV prevention programmes for
vulnerable groups in southern India. Using qualitative methods, it
compares the nature of transaction costs of two different con-
tracting models - the SACS programmes of State X and State Y. In so
doing it attempts to test the theoretical proposition that, in the case
of publicly ﬁnanced health services, although behaviours are not
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forms of governance are still better able to cope with serious
contractual difﬁculties and the complexities of contracting with
large numbers.
Methods
Sample
Two Indian states with differing modes of NGO contracting, that
were contracting with more than 50 NGOs and where adult HIV
prevalence was considered to be high (1% or higher) at the time of
data collection (2002) were selected. The government supported
AIDS control programmes in State Y and State X were implemented
by 3 SACS. XSACS, XMSACS were in State X and YSACS in State Y.
Each of these agencies were responsible for the range of HIV/AIDS
activities within their state or municipal region including the
contracting out to NGOs the delivery of HIV prevention services for
targeted populations, such as commercial sex workers (CSWs),
truck drivers, slum dwellers and men who have sex with men
(MSM). XSACS and XMSACS contracted directly with the NGOs
whereas YSACS employed an intermediary management agency to
manage the contracting process, from tendering to capacity
support to monitoring and evaluation. The two contracting models
are outlined in Fig. 1.
For each contracting model, a case study approach was used
to collect data on the transaction costs of contracting.
Commercial sex worker (CSW) projects were selected from the
range of different projects, to ensure like was compared with like
and so strengthen comparative analyses. In state Y, case studies
were selected to represent a range of project history, levels of
capacity and experience and location. At XSACS interviews were
held with those NGOs available and willing to participate, as
many of the NGOs initially selected using the former criteria did
not respond to our invitation. At XMSACS, the only 2 CSW
projects functioning at the time of our census were selected. In
addition, to see how transaction costs varied across projects for
other target groups, 2 non CSW projects were included in the
analysis. The case study numbers and descriptions are summar-
ised in Table 1.Fig. 1. Models used for contracting out HIV prevenData collection and analysis
The non-explicit nature of some transaction costs and the need
to understand the transaction characteristics, including patterns of
institutional behaviour and the institutional environment, mean
that quantitative analyses alone fail to capture the transaction cost
problem. As a result, qualitative research methods using purpo-
sively selected case studies to represent and describe different
contracting models, semi-structured interviews and a survey of
documents were applied to gain a greater understanding of
transaction costs (Allen, 2002; Ashton, 1998; Masten, Meehan, &
Snyder, 1991; Palmer & Mills, 2003). The analysis used a deduc-
tive approach to examine whether the governance implications of
variations in transaction cost patterns suggested by Williamson
(1983) hold for contracting out HIV prevention services
(Williamson, 1983). Following Mays and Pope (2000), the paper
assumes a “subtle realist” approach i.e. that in spite of the subjec-
tivity of research, there is some underlying reality, independent of
the researcher, that can be identiﬁed through the research process
(Fulop, Allen, Clarke, & Black, 2001; Mays & Pope, 2000). The data
were collected between 2002 and 2004 and anonymised in order to
encourage participants to talk freely.
The semi-structured interviews were carried out between
December 2002 and May 2003 by the author (a non-Indian female,
with no local language knowledge) in the presence of a research
assistant from the state in which the project was located, following
an interview guide. They were carried out with the directors,
ﬁnance managers and those responsible for the management of the
HIV prevention projects at the SACS and management agencies
(referred to as XSACS or YSACS), project directors and project
managers at the NGOs and a set of key informants (KI). Key infor-
mants were identiﬁed during the process of data collection and
included those individuals found to have extensive either current
or historical knowledge of one or all the HIV prevention pro-
grammes. Interviews were conducted in English. English language
ability was sufﬁcient that it was not necessary for any of the
interviews to be wholly conducted in a local language. If a problem
of language arose, the research assistant translated questions and
responses. Where permission was granted, interviews were taped
and transcribed by the author. In all cases, notes were taken by bothtion services to NGOs in State X and State Y.
Table 1
Description of the State AIDS control societies’ targeted intervention programmes in State X and State Y and the NGO Case Studies, 2002.
State X State Y
Programmes XSACS, XMSACS Merging of management of state level programmes
under one SACS (2001)
Method of contracting Direct contracting with NGOs Intermediary carries out contract management, technical
support and monitoring and evaluation on behalf of YSACS
Number of NGO targeted HIV prevention projects XSACS-65, XMSACS-7 101
Of which sex worker projects: XSACS -21, XMSACS -2 18
No. of case studies XSACS e 5, XMSACS e 2 11
Of which sex worker projects: XSACS e 4, XMSACS e 2 9
Average Age of NGO, years (range) 19 (6e38) 18 (5e89)
Average years experience with HIV (range) 7 (4e12) 5 (3e14)
Average annual expenditure of NGO, INRa,c (range) 3,862,403 (700,000e45,784,404) 2,420,160 (224,800e105,372,462)
Average no. of staff in NGO (range) 43 (8e176) 26 (10e477)
Number of NGOs with FCRAb certiﬁcates 5 10
a N ¼ 5 for XSACS and XMSACS combined.
b Government issued certiﬁcate which allows NGO to receive foreign funds.
c *USD 1 ¼ INR 45.12.
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other and the transcriptions, where available, for consistency. Any
issues that needed clariﬁcation were followed up with further
interviews.
The transaction costs of the contracting out of services to NGOs
were analysed by examining ﬁve areas of inﬂuence: the institu-
tional environment; informational problems including bounded
rationality and uncertainty; opportunism; and asset speciﬁcity. To
contextualize these four areas and to better understand the impact
of the scale of the programme, the contractual process including
the size of each programmes are ﬁrst described. Evidence of these
different aspects of transaction costs was extracted from interview
transcripts and documents and the qualitative data were then
manually coded according to those themes. Important themeswere
identiﬁed through triangulation of data, in the form of issues raised
by more than one source. Where data sources appeared to
contradict the theory or each other, these contradictions were
reassessed in light of the context of the data source. The transaction
cost implications were classiﬁed according to whether they were
“direct” and would be incurred through monitoring and manage-
ment or indirect and incurred through wastage, leakage or poor
quality. Comparisons of the themes were then made across the
contracting models. A ﬁrst draft of the ﬁndings was circulated
around the research team and two key informants, who agreed to
read the document, for review and corroboration.Results
The contractual process
The general contractual process that each SAC adhered follows
guidelines issued by the National AIDS Control Organisation
(NACO) in Delhi. The SACS contracted with the NGO to provide HIV
prevention services for vulnerable groups having selected the NGOs
through a competitive tendering process. Project guidelines meant
that each NGO project comprised four basic components: condom
distribution; referral for STI treatment or treatment itself; educa-
tional activities (one-to-one and group); and strengthening links
with the community. Once the contract was signed the NGO had
a legal commitment to implement their project according to the
proposal and adhere with ﬁnancial guidelines. They were reim-
bursed against quarterly expenditure reports up to the budget
agreed at outset. The contracts were renewed annually subject to
meeting monitoring requirements and submission of a proposal. A
third party evaluationwas also carried out at the end of three years.
Nothing was stated in the contracts as to what penalties would beimposed if there were a breach of contract, nor what entails
a contract breach.
State X
Established in 1996, XSACS increased the number of NGOs
contracted by the state programme from 17 in 1994/1995 to over
100 in 1997/1998 (Seshadri, 2003). There was no historical
evidence to provide an indication of the number of NGOs bidding to
win the contracts in the original contract rounds and provide an
indication of the competitiveness of the market. However, the scale
of the programme itself was not sustained. Between 1999 and 2002,
the number of NGOs supported fell to between 40 and 65 NGOs,
each of them delivering a single project for this funding agency.
XMSACS was established in 2001. NGO contracting activities
commenced in 2002, with the transfer of all metropolitan based
interventions from XSACS to the XMSACS programme.
Once an NGO was recruited and started implementation,
claiming funding instalments required the submission of monthly
reports for the National AIDS Control Programme (NACP) moni-
toring system and a report from a monitoring team, consisting of
volunteer experts from other NGOs. Contract renewal took place
annually with the submission of a proposal for the following year
reviewed by a Technical Advisory Committee (National AIDS
Control Organisation, 2004). In the event that malpractice was
perceived to have occurred, government ofﬁcials were sent to the
NGOs to investigate (XSACS). If the malpractice was proved to have
occurred the contract was stopped and the NGO was blacklisted.
XSACS provided 8 different training sessions, attended by 137
NGOs from 1999 to the end of the period of analysis. These were
complemented by experience sharing workshops, although these
were sporadic (NGO16). Therewas no uniformity of participation in
training or workshops across the NGOs. A single NGO advisor, with
support from clerical staff, was responsible for receiving and pro-
cessing the monitoring and ﬁnancial reports. Although a post was
assigned for a monitoring and evaluation ofﬁcer, this post was still
vacant at the end of the data collection period. The SACS were
therefore dependent on the staff of a core group of capable NGOs
for carrying out both capacity development and monitoring for the
NGO programme.
State Y
State Y received support for its HIV prevention activities from
a number of different sources since 1998. Prior to this, therewas little
HIV prevention work in the state. In 2001, it was decided that all
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channelled through the SACS and the management of all NGO-SACS
contracts streamlined and contracted out to one agency. This
management agency was awarded the 3-year contract through
competitive tender andwaspaid a pre-agreedﬁxed annual overhead.
It was governed by a project steering committee which meets on
a regular basis and comprised representatives from the key stake-
holders. The number of NGO contracts rose from 23 in 1999 to 101 in
2002, all delivering a single project for YSACS, except for one which
has the responsibility for two projects. Interviews with the manage-
ment agency revealed that there was a signiﬁcant competition for
these contracts when the work was ﬁrst initiated, with over 1000
applications made. However, during the second round NGOs were
selected from the shortlist made in the ﬁrst round of recruitment.
The management agency employed a team of full-time experts
outside standard government employment conditions, and had the
freedom to hire and ﬁre personnel. The budget also allowed for the
recruitment of additional agencies to provide further technical
support for research, planning and development of educational
materials, subject to the approval of YSACS, allowing the pro-
gramme to draw in extra expertise in a timely manner. As well as
providing ﬂexibility, the management agency was a third party to
the transaction and therefore able to lobby YSACS on behalf of the
NGOs, if necessary, while also increasing transparency in NGO
recruitment decisions.
The management agency was intrinsically involved in the NGO
contract design and renewal process. Once recruited the NGOs
were invited to participate in proposal development workshops
and trained in carrying out needs assessment surveys. The
proposals were subsequently revised in consultation with the
management agency. Contract renewal was a consultative process
and again the management agency provides direction in activities,
target setting and budgeting. Written guidelines in ﬁnancial
management were also provided to the NGOs to support the con-
tracting process.
The management agency provided a higher quantity of training
sessions than in state X, with greater uniformity across the NGOs. In
2001/02 alone they trained 57 batches of NGO staff, covering 13
technical areas. Monitoring visits were also used as a capacity
development exercises. If malpractice came to light YSACS requests
an investigationwhich was carried out by the management agency.
During the investigation the project was suspended and did not
receive funds. Most of the investigations were initiated as a result of
anonymous letters or phone calls to YSACS (management agency).Institutional environment
Beyond the mechanics of the contract, the study revealed that
the institutional environment was characterised by distrust,
frequent interruptions in fund ﬂows andweaknesses in capacity for
contracting. First, contracting took place in an environment in
which there was already signiﬁcant distrust between NGOs and
government and corruption is well known (Bennett & Mills, 1998;
Das Gupta, Khaleghian, & Sarwal, 2003; Transparency
International, 2002). This distrust was manifest in both the
reports of opportunism in the interviews for this study and an
imbalance in the contractual relationship. The NGOs did not feel
they had many rights within the contract and were vulnerable to
frequent delays in the transfer of funds:
“It is a one-sided document, except to counter-sign the bond.
there is nothing legal we can do if they do not deliver.. (we are)
powerless in a legal sense to ﬁght funding delays” (NGO14)
“They (the NGOs) can’t ask questions e that is the government
system” (XSACS)Second, the funds released by the National AIDS Control Orga-
nisation to the SACS rarely met the budget that had been approved
and fund releases were regularly delayed (KI; YSACS). This led to
delays in the release of funds to the NGOs. Three NGO case studies
experienced delays on 7 different expected releases over 4 years,
ranging from a few days to 8 months. NGOs not reporting delays in
quantitative form complained that were always delays. In turn this
resulted in an inability to plan, in drawing on reserves, the inability
to pay salaries, project closures, and an increased level of distrust
between the NGOs and their funders. The cause of these delays
related to both the expenditure ceiling of the Government of India’s
10th Expenditure Plan and was exacerbated by inadequate
resources, ﬁnancial, human and technical, at the NGO and SACS.
The capacity of the SACS was constrained largely by human
resource gaps. During the period of analysis, the SACS in State X had
experienced frequent leadership change and empty or inade-
quately ﬁlled staff posts. At XMSACS, during a single year there
were four changes of director while the post of NGO advisor
remained empty. In addition, decision-making was reported to be
constrained by political inﬂuence over-riding technical inputs
(NGOs 13, 14). As a result XMSACS’ credibility was questioned by
the NGOs:
“They (the XMSACS technical advisory committee) check the
credibility of the proposal then recommend. But it was not so
seriously done. It didn’t give us the impression they had applied
their minds at all” (NGO 14)
Similarly, between 2001 and 2005, XSACS directors remained in
post for up to the limited period of 12 months. This was combined
with a mixed quality or lack of personnel in posts that are crucial to
the function of the programme (NGOs 6, 14, 16). This has weakened
the ability to sustain capacity. The NGOs expressed disappointment
in the leaders and their frequent changes, stating that programme
quality had declined considerably since the early days (KI; NGOs 6,
14, 16).
In contrast, in State Y, there was some continuity of directorship
at the SACS level. The director at YSACS prior to the study was in
post for a period of 2 years, and was followed by a director who
stayed in post for four years. This time allowed for learning as well
as a sense of ownership (KI). Although the management agency in
State Y was better technically resourced and managed to ﬁll critical
NGO programme management posts, a large under-spend in the
ﬁrst year of activity could be partially attributed to the 6 month
absence of a Team Leader at the management agency, demon-
strating the impact such gaps in human resources can have. In State
Y continuity led to capacity development and the facilitating of NGO
partnerships, reducing the distrust between the contractual parties.
Informational problems
Shared features
Outcomes are difﬁcult to measure in HIV prevention services.
The target population is unpredictable and dynamic giving rise to
problems in consistent monitoring. This is compounded by the
relatively new nature of the HIV/AIDS problem and the low level of
awareness even among the NGOs. The training, experience sharing,
networking, monitoring and supervision were used to compensate
for the highly quantitative emphasis in the formal monitoring
system and gather information informally.
State X
The monitoring system in State X was seen as particularly weak
(Dalal Mott MacDonald Pvt Ltd, 2002). Document review of
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project (Guinness, Kumaranayake, & Hanson, 2007; Guinness,
Kumaranayake, Rajaraman, Sankaranarayanan, Vannela, Raghupathi
et al., 2005) found it impossible to track activity and ﬁnancial
reports: there were inconsistent sets of data across NGOs; and
complete sets of reports were not available for the majority of NGOs.
Quality of the projects was also unknown (Comptroller and Auditor
General of India, 2004). External evaluations for State X did not
capture quality and NGOs reported that queries from XSACS focused
on the ﬁnancial rather than the technical (NGOs 6.8). Other problems
in the systemincluded: lackof feedback fromthemonitoring teams to
theNGOs (NGOs6,8,19); insufﬁcient resources forNGOsupervision (2
KIs); mis-reporting of outputs and activities (XSACS; NGO 6); and
potential bias in the monitoring team who were all staff from
“competitor” NGOs (other NGOs in contractual partnership with the
SACS) (NGOs 6, 8).
“There is no monitoring system” (NGO 6).State Y
Conversely, in State Y, the NGOs perceived the monitoring as
a strength and a vital part of the contracting system (NGOs 2,9),
placing importance on its capacity building aspects (NGOs 8,18,19),
in spite of the quantitative emphasis (NGOs 9,10,12) and the time
required (NGOs 2,15).
“Themonitoring system is best; it allows us to make rectiﬁcations.
it may be time consuming but it will improve and support our
work” (NGO 18).
The NGOs also placed importance on their relationship with the
management agency and YSACS:
“Transparency is there; ..anything we will discuss; .. Ours
(relationship) is informal e we are friends ..” (NGO 2).
“YSACS is a good donor.. providing to the NGOs funds and guid-
ance and training” (NGO 5).Opportunism and ability to control it
Corruption appeared to be an endemic problem. It was present
both at the funding agency and NGO levels, comprising bribery,
staff exploitation, mis-reporting and the funding of non-existent
projects. As can be seen in Table 2, these practises led to an effective
reduction in expenditures and activities, a poor reﬂection of actual
activities in monitoring reports, a skewed distribution of budgetary
allocations and further mis-reporting. The perceived level of
corruption appeared to vary across states and depended on the
contracting system. In addition, one key informant criticized XSACSTable 2
Level and impact of funding delays and corruption on the implementation of the HIV pr
Problem
Mis-direction of funds (NGO 6)
Under-appointment and under-payment of staff for whom full salaries
are claimed (KI; MA; NGOs 9,10)
Mis-reporting of activities (NGOs 6,9,10); mis-use of STI drug and travel
allowances (NGO 10; MA)
Staff and target group exploitation (NGO 9; MA)
Bribing of government ofﬁcials and management agency staff (XSACS; KIs 1,3,4;
NGOs 8,10,14,16,17)
Projects funded but not in existence (research team observation)
MA = management agency.for simplifying its ﬁnancial monitoring system. Although the
former system had caused delays, it had screened out misspending
of up to $1 million over three years (KI).
“Now (2002) corruption has come back in” (KI e on XSACS)
Nevertheless, in spite of concerns regarding corrupt practises,
XSACS had blacklisted only one NGO since 1996.
In State Y it appeared that the management agency, as a third
party, was able to make NGO recruitment and evaluation more
transparent (KI). Facilitating this transparency were the experience
sharing workshops where incidence of NGO staff exploitation were
uncovered. It appeared better able to overcome opportunistic
behaviour:
“.Can’t give (external evaluators) bribes e the NGOs don’t know
them” (NGO 8).
“There is very little corruption in the (management agency) pro-
gramme.. (other government funded programmes) those
people they directly ask for money” (NGO 2).
By mid 2003, the management agency had completed investi-
gations on 9 NGOs and 5 projects had been terminated. In addition,
the management agency had used its ﬂexibility to remove their
staff when they were found to be involved in bribery (KI).Asset speciﬁcity
Where asset speciﬁcity is present, barriers to entry and exit in
the contract are created leaving parties in the contract more
vulnerable when opportunism and informational problems arise.
The human and temporal asset speciﬁc nature of the service led to
a dependence on the NGOs on the part of the SACS in both states,
although the investment in training, contact time with the NGOs
and the development of partnerships with the NGOs varied across
the programmes. In State Y, this manifested itself in falling
competitiveness in the NGO sector: the second round of NGO
recruitment did not involve re-advertisement but a return to the
original shortlist of NGO applicants; and, more recently, under the
management agency, when a need for re-focussing some of the less
successful projects was identiﬁed, rather than terminate contracts
and re-advertise, the existing NGO partners had their projects re-
designed. XSACS presented a concern that the NGOs might seek
funding from other sources:
“If they (NGOs) have FCRA certiﬁcate (registered to receive
foreign funds) they will go elsewhere” (XSACS).
If the NGO lost the contract, there was a real possibility of
securing funding from elsewhere given the momentum in HIV
programme funding in India at the time. On the other hand, there
were also opportunity costs to the NGO of losing the contract,evention projects.
Impact on implementation
Effective reductions in expenditure on activities
Monitoring does not reﬂect reality and therefore inability to identify
gaps in services
Activity levels lower than reported and funded
Encourages NGOs to mis-report in order to demonstrate they have met targets
Larger budgets awarded to those NGOs willing to pay bribes rather than those
with greatest need
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supported project; seeking funding elsewhere; and funding gaps
that may mean they lose the trust of the communities with whom
they work.Comparison of the contracting mechanisms in the two states
Fig. 2 summarizes the characterization of the transaction costs
in the two states. At XSACS the high costs of funding delays and
contractual frequency led to the streamlining of ﬁnancial and other
monitoring requirements. Under the conditions of dependence of
the funder on the funded, the degree of NGO autonomy and the
distance between the NGOs identiﬁed in the analysis, state X con-
tracting could be characterized as a relational type governance
structure. However, it appears that this structure’s ability to
implement the current programme size was limited, with the
number of NGO contracts falling during the phase of the pro-
gramme under analysis. Observations suggest that XSACS simply
had too many projects (NGO 6; KI) and inadequate human
resources to carry out the intensive monitoring required. Funding
delays persisted, problems with meeting monitoring requirements
were evident and capacity development had not been sufﬁciently
realised (NGO 6, 16, 14). Added to this, the contracting programme
continued to be undermined by opportunism.
YSACS used the management agency mechanism to implement
the scale up of its NGO programme. By providing for greater
operational independence and ﬂexibility in recruiting technical
expertise, the management agency model was able to deliver more
NGO projects and scale up the number of contracts faster (Soni &
Jani, 2001). The management agency played a directive role in
project design and budgeting. All NGOs received training in both
technical and managerial aspects of the programme. CapacityFig. 2. Transaction cost characteristics of the contdevelopment inputs led to strong ties between NGOs and with the
management agency, accountability and clarity in the project
methods, with one NGO comparing the structure to a company
(NGO 15). A technical team strengthened the NGO links with the
management agency in a way that the single NGO advisor at XSACS
was not able to achieve. However, with the merging of the
management structure and as the number of NGOs managed by
a single structure had increased, some NGOs found the contractual
process declining in quality:
“With the large number of NGOs now monitoring is not really
happening; loose ends are there and misuse” (NGO9).
“Now the NGOs are more, the capacity development is less; slowly
it has come down. It. is happening but less than compared to before”
(NGO2).
In spite of these problems encountered by the NGOs and
persistent opportunistic behaviour, it is evident that the manage-
ment agency and YSACS still maintained considerable control over
the design and implementation of the individual projects and were
able to reduce corrupt practises (KI). This greater control and closer
relations between the NGOs and the management structure than in
state X suggests a more integrated approach to the delivery of the
HIV prevention services.Discussion
The analysis presented here explores the transaction cost
characteristics of two models for contracting out HIV prevention
services in India and how closely these relate to transaction cost
theory (Williamson, 1987). Using a deductive qualitative approach,
based on a combination of document review and semi-structured
interviews and supported by the research team’s observations, the
analysis shows how transaction costs for these complex contractsracting for HIV prevention in states X and Y.
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Paradoxically, however, due to the inﬂexibility of the Government
of India bureaucracy, this form of integration could only be ach-
ieved through contracting out the management of the NGO
contracts. The Williamson framework was developed for analyses
of the private sector and assumes proﬁt maximising behaviour.
However, previous analyses in the public sector that build on the
Williamson framework have shown that asset speciﬁcity, bounded
rationality and opportunism are still important factors to consider
in the process of contract design (Allen, 2002; Ashton, 1998;
Palmer, 2000). In the context of contracting out HIV prevention
services in India, where government contracts with not-for-proﬁt
organisations, the same factors apply. HIV prevention services are
difﬁcult to monitor creating informational problems. There is
a need for asset speciﬁc investment in training, monitoring and
supervision associated with establishing the programme. In addi-
tion, the HIV prevention programme in India was plagued with
uncertainty arising from fund management and opportunism.
According to the theory, the combination of these factors all point
towards “serious contractual difﬁculties” and, in the proﬁt maxi-
mizing world, more hierarchical forms of governance. At the same
time contracting out of HIV prevention services by the government
was a deliberate move away from the Government of India
bureaucracy in the search for efﬁciency.
Hierarchical forms of governance as described by Williamson
were not apparent in either of the contractual models under
observation in this study. Evidence from both states demonstrates
how comprehensive contracting was also not feasible given the
combination of bounded rationality and opportunism inherent in
the nature of the services, combined with the features of the local
context and contract design. XSACS reduced the demands on the
monitoring system to minimise delays, depended on a core of
technically competent NGOs to help roll out the programme and
took a bottom up (NGO led) approach to planning and to contract
management. A relational style contract was therefore seen to
evolve. The NGOs had freedom to implement their respective
project designs and penalties against project mis-management
were limited. In addition, the level of technical resources and
commitment available at the funding agency has further con-
strained the ability to effectively manage the contracts. As a result,
opportunism and funding delays persisted, there was inadequate
investment in capacity development and the number of NGO
contracts declined. Without major change in the contracting
system and renewed commitment in the form of resources, the
success of this relational contracting will be determined by the
extent to which opportunistic behaviour of both parties continues.
In State Y, YSACS contracted out NGO contract management to
a third party, representing an even greater step away from hier-
archical forms of governance. By creating an opportunity for
ﬂexibility inmanagement and through the increased availability of
resources, the process of contracting out the management of the
contracts led to direction in project design, stronger capacity
development, greater investment in NGO partnerships and direct
supervision. Although the NGOs held a contract with the SACS,
they reported to and dealt with the management agency. A rela-
tional contract developed between these parties in which oppor-
tunism appeared to be reduced by the investment in the
NGO-management agency relationship. However, with limited
access to the legal system for the NGOs, the power of the SACS to
simply stop an NGO contract and the tight supervision of the NGOs
by the management agency, the relational contract retained some
elements of a hierarchical form of governance. This hybrid form of
governance appears to be better able to cope with the informa-
tional problems and opportunism identiﬁed in the contracting
models as well as the scaling up of the NGO programme. Since thisstudy the management agency approach has been rolled out at the
national level.
The improved ability to manage the contracts associated with
the management agency may have been a result of absolute
funding levels rather than the governance arrangements and their
ability to minimise transaction costs. Evidence from State X
suggests the contrary where, in spite of the budget increasing from
INR 40 million to INR 64 million (USD 1 ¼ INR 45.12), XSACS
expenditure on the targeted intervention programme fell from INR
55 million (this exceeds the budget as extra resources were allo-
cated to the programme due to its initial success) in 1999/2000 to
26.5 INR million in 2002/03. This implies that the problems did not
lie in resource constraints but rather in ability to spend. Although
comparable ﬁgures are not available in State Y, due to the changing
management structures over the period of analysis, it can be
inferred that ﬁnancial costs were necessarily higher with
a management agency than without. The analysis suggests that
these extra costs helped to offset the opportunity costs of weak
monitoring systems, poor technical and ﬁnancial reporting
capacity, NGO distrust of government (and vice versa) and oppor-
tunism, even increasing the ability to spend and scale up.
Several limitations to the analysis need to be noted. First, the
qualitative nature of the study did not facilitate a direct comparison
of the twomodels and it was not possible to identify on an absolute
basis which contracting model minimised transaction costs.
Instead, the study aims to identify the nature of those transaction
costs and, through analysis of the qualitative information gathered,
ascertain which contractual model is more successful in scaling up
NGO contracting. Second, the documentation sourced for the study
was mixed in quality. There were conﬂicting ﬁgures on expendi-
tures, coverage and number of NGO contracts given in different
documents and it was often difﬁcult to discern the reality. Where
there was doubt, ﬁgures that are reported to National AIDS Control
Organisation were used. However, this level of uncertainty in
reporting only served to accentuate some of the ﬁndings regarding
the informational problems. The ﬁndings relating to opportunism
in state X were also underlined by the lack of communication from
NGOs originally selected for our sample. Unwillingness to partici-
pate may have stemmed from having something to hide or not
having the time. Further enquiries with the key informants sug-
gested that the former was likely in most cases, in which case the
analysis has possibly failed to pick up on further evidence of
opportunism. With regards to the interviews, many of the NGOs
perceived that we came from their funding agencies, in spite of
explanations that we were not, and their answers could have been
shaped by this perception. In addition, the differences between
Indian English and British English complicated the explanation of
some issues, possibly leading to misunderstandings or misinter-
pretation. Further, not all interviews were taped. Although the
notes of the interviewer and the research assistant present were
cross-checked against each other to minimize these problems, it is
recognised that there can be ﬂaws in note taking and they can be
more prone to greater subjectivity than taped and transcribed
interviews.
As investment in HIV prevention continues and the SACS
programmes evolve, the contracting models have important
lessons for the future phases of the National AIDS Control Pro-
gramme as well as to other South Asian countries, where similar
NGO contracting programmes are being supported by the World
Bank (e.g. Bangladesh and Pakistan). Policy lessons derived from
the analysis are threefold. Firstly, contracting out the manage-
ment of the NGO contracts is a method that can be used to
overcome the informational problems associated with the service
itself as well as the bureaucratic constraints observed in the
SACS. Second, transaction costs might be reduced and project
L. Guinness / Social Science & Medicine 72 (2011) 1939e1947 1947quality improved by re-designing the ﬁnancial procedures to
enable longer term planning, while retaining an incentive for
NGOs to perform. Third, an important factor in minimising
transaction costs is strong positive relationships between the
NGOs and their funder or management agency.
As well as these important policy lessons, the analysis has
shown that the transaction cost economics framework provides
a useful tool in helping to understand the nature of contractual
relations in the public as well as the private sector. It conﬁrms that
where uncertainty leads to incomplete contract speciﬁcation and
relational contracting, elements of hierarchical governance that are
retained can strengthen the ability of the contract to meet its
intended goal and cope with contracting in large numbers.
Conclusion
The application of the transaction cost framework to the situa-
tion of contracting out public services to not-for-proﬁt organisa-
tions has allowed the identiﬁcation of key costs associated with the
governance of HIV prevention services through NGO contracts in
India. The analysis shows how a relational form of governance with
elements of hierarchy evolved within the network of the contract
management agency and the NGOs. This has led to greater trans-
parency, improved ﬂows of information and perceived quality, and
limited corrupt practises. In turn, the reduction in opportunity costs
of poor quality and leakage arising from poorly managed trans-
actions, in spite of higher ﬁnancial costs, highlights the importance
of hybrid models governance systems where full contract speciﬁ-
cation is not possible and there are “serious contractual difﬁcul-
ties”. It is unlikely that the SACS on its own, with its broader
responsibilities and limited autonomy can achieve the same ends.
The management agency approach therefore appeared to be both
better able to manage large numbers of contracts and transaction
cost reducing.
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